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In this paper, we empirically examine how the revenue model (paid, free, or freemium) adopted for a
given app affects the app revenue performance as measured by the app daily revenue rank. We also study
the impact of in-app purchase on this measure of performance. Moreover, we study how such relation-
ships are contingent upon the distribution platform where the app is marketed as well as the type of
category to which the app belongs. We test our hypotheses relying on a large sample of top grossing apps
from the two major app stores, namely Apple’s App Store and Google Play. Our findings reveal that in the
Apple’s App Store, paid and freemium models are equivalent and both are more effective than the free
model in terms of app revenue performance. On the other hand, in Google Play no significant differences
between paid and free revenue models emerge, whereas the freemiummodel is shown to be less effective
even than the free model. Moreover, while in-app purchase is shown to positively influence the app
revenue performance in Apple’s App Store, this effect is reversed in Google Play. Finally, the type of
category is also shown to influence the effects of the revenue model and in-app purchase (the latter to
a lesser extent) on the app performance.
 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Software developed for mobile phones has been around for well
over a decade. Indeed, in the early 2000s, before the term ‘applica-
tion store’ was popularized, the distribution of mobile content was
dominated by the Mobile Portal business model. Mobile Portals
were mostly managed by Mobile Network Operators (MNOs),
which constructed a highly centralized model (Kuo and Yu 2006).
However, the mobile content ecosystem was at first unclear and
did not attract enough developers and users to really soar, possibly
due to the fact that the technology was not mature. This relatively
stable context was dramatically shaken in 2008 by Apple, which,
by launching the app store, introduced a new distribution para-
digm in mobile commerce: the application store. An application
store is essentially an online distribution platform from which
users can download software applications for mobile devices to
increase the utility associated to their usage.
Mobile applications (apps, hereafter) are typically developed by
third parties, which can be either software houses or individuals.
App stores operate as online two-sided markets, generatingmutual advantages to all involved actors (Hagiu 2007). By means
of developers, the platform owner, e.g., Apple, can exploit indirect
network externalities that increase the value of its own devices
and/or operating systems (OS). In fact, the higher the number of
apps running on a device, the higher the potential functionalities
of such device. On the other hand, developers are interested in dis-
tributing their apps via app stores, because this allows them to
reach a multitude of consumers worldwide that they might not
be able to reach on their own. Finally, consumers derive higher
utility from the presence of a higher number of developers in the
app stores as they have larger product variety available for pur-
chase. The revenue-sharing rule adopted by Apple (and also by
all major stores) implies that, for each transaction, 70% of the rev-
enue goes to the developer, while the platform owner retains 30%
of it.1
Nowadays a multitude of applications have become everyday
‘‘tools” in the life of people who want to be connected 24/7. As a
matter of fact, according to Venturebeat, the app market has
shown an astonishing growth stepping from less than $10 billionted from
pp store
adopt to
2 Given the large number of app categories commercialized in major app stores, we
do not formulate a priori hypotheses on the relationship between revenue models and
app revenue performance for each specific category. Rather, posit that the category
certainly plays a role in shaping such relationship and postpone the discussion related
to specific categories to the result and practical implications sections.
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(Takahashi 2014). Other sources provide even rosier predictions
suggesting that the global mobile market will reach $150 billion
by the end of 2015 (Ghose and Han 2014). To take advantage of
the great potential of this market, in the last few years, numerous
mobile device makers, such as RIM, Samsung, etc, have followed
Apple’s move. Such a rapid proliferation of app stores has involved
not only traditional players of the smartphone industry, but also
important new entrants such as Google, which launched its
Android mobile Operating Systems (OS) and made the Android
Market (later rebranded as Google Play) available to app users in
2008. However, as a result of great market consolidation, nowa-
days the scene is dominated by only two players: Apple’s App Store
and Google Play, which have become by far the most popular
stores, retaining together almost 90% of the market (Gartner
2013). In particular, although Apple’s App Store still generates
higher revenue, Google Play delivers 60% more app downloads
than Apple (Wallenstein 2015). These exemplificative figures as
well as the online nature of the transactions in the app market
demonstrate the relevance of this market in the context of
Electronic Commerce (EC).
In this highly dynamic and competitive environment app
developers are required to make several important decisions. For
instance, they have to choose the type and the number of apps to
market, which mobile operating systems to develop for and, hence,
which app store to target, and finally which revenue model to
choose for each app. These decisions are naturally pivotal for
developers as they determine the success or the failure of apps
(and their developers) in the market. However, in contrast to the
huge popularity, the academic world has started devoting atten-
tion to the dynamics of success in this market only recently. For
instance, a few initial empirical studies have focused on app
demand estimation (Carare 2012; Garg and Telang 2013; Ghose
and Han 2014) or purchase intention of paid apps (Hsu and Lin
2015). In addition, focusing on a case study, Halaburda et al.
(2011) have examined the rationale behind the choice of the plat-
form to develop for. However, no empirical studies have instead
investigated the impact of the revenue model chosen for an app
on its performance in the market. It is extremely important to shed
light on this issue for two main reasons. From a practical view-
point, the choice of the revenue model is perceived as one of the
most difficult and crucially important decisions by app developers
in order to succeed in the market, as demonstrated by the numer-
ous industry articles focusing on this issue (Sourcebits 2014;
Pappas 2013; Wilcox 2013; Munir 2014). As a matter of fact, a mul-
titude of app developers struggle with the choice of the appropri-
ate revenue model for their apps as the mobile app market has
become very competitive and many developers suffer from low
sales (Sourcebits 2014). From a literature viewpoint, our study is
important because, although the performance implications of rev-
enue models in the context of information goods and/or EC have
been extensively discussed in the literature, still no univocal indi-
cations can be drawn. In fact, in this respect, contrasting views
have emerged with some early studies supporting the economics
of free with advertising (Anderson 2009), and other studies docu-
menting the recent trends toward the use of models that require
a payment to all or some users (i.e., paid or freemium) for online
content provision (Pauwels and Weiss 2008). Therefore, further
research is needed to better understand the effectiveness of differ-
ent revenue models, especially with regard to a business setting
such as the app market, where the choice of the revenue model
and the relative economic consequences have never been investi-
gated in previous literature in spite of being so pivotal for the fate
of an app and its developer. The empirical investigation developed
in this study contributes to fill this gap. Specifically, it aims at
shedding light on:1. The impact of existing app revenue models (namely, free, paid,
freemium) on the app revenue performance, as measured by
the app daily revenue rank, and whether (and how) this impact
depends on the store (Apple’s App Store vs. Google Play) where
the app is marketed and the nature of the app itself (i.e., the
category to which the app belongs).
2. The revenue performance implications of adopting the practice
of in-app purchase (i.e., purchase of additional app features
directly inside the app at incremental prices), and whether
(and how) these revenue implications depend on the store
where the app is marketed and the nature of the app itself.
With regard to the first point, in line with previous studies (e.g.,
Pauwels and Weiss, 2008) and motivated by the large popularity of
free apps, we characterize our empirical study as a comparison of
payment-based (paid and freemium) versus free models. That is,
we formulate our hypotheses mainly as a comparison between
payment-based (paid and freemium) versus free models to be con-
sistent with prior literature. However, our analysis also takes into
account the comparison between paid and freemium models
(which is indeed included in one of our hypotheses). By testing
our hypotheses through different statistical methods, we are able
to compare the revenue performance of all the considered revenue
models (free, paid, and freemium) and thus answer to our research
question on revenue models for apps. With regard to the second
point, we endeavor to understand whether the adoption of the
in-app purchase practice in addition to the chosen revenue model
can yield a revenue performance advantage to developers, and thus
formulate our hypothesis accordingly. By providing empirical evi-
dence of the effectiveness of in-app purchase, we also contribute
to the literature on versioning (Shapiro and Varian 1999;
Bhargava and Choudhary, 2001, 2008), as in-app purchase is
indeed a peculiar form of versioning. Finally, with regard to both
first and second points, it is important to understand whether
and how the effects of revenue models and in-app purchase deci-
sions depend on distribution platform and app nature. Thus, we
formulate hypotheses on whether (and how) the store (Apple’s
App Store vs. Google Play) and the app category influence the
relationship of revenue models and in-app purchase with revenue
performance.2 As explained later in detail, different platforms may
be accessed by consumers with different characteristics (e.g., will-
ingness to pay). As a result, developers’ ability to monetize on their
‘‘creatures” depends not only on the choice of the revenue model
(and in-app purchase) but also on whether and how the given
revenue model (and the practice of in-app purchase) fits with the
environment (Apple vs. Google ecosystems) where the app is
marketed and the nature of the app itself.
To our purposes, we utilize an ad-hoc panel dataset of randomly
selected apps obtained by collecting data from the two major app
stores, Apple’s App Store and Google Play, for a period of twenty
weeks. To increase reliability and robustness of our findings, we
test our hypotheses by using two different statistical approaches,
namely regression analysis and Mann–Whitney non-parametric
tests performed on opportunely matched subsamples. By way of
anticipation, our findings reveal that there is no absolute
dominance of a specific revenue model. Indeed, the effect of the
revenue models is strongly contingent upon the distribution
platform where the given app is marketed. Specifically, we find
that in the Apple’s App Store, paid and freemiummodels are shown
to be more effective than the free model in terms app revenue
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tically similar revenue performance. On the other hand, in Google
Play no significant differences between paid and free revenue
models emerge, whereas the freemium model is shown to be less
effective even than the free model. With regard to in-app purchase,
the effect of this practice is also shown to depend on the distribu-
tion platform. Specifically, while in-app purchase is shown to
positively influence the app revenue performance in Apple’s App
Store, this effect is reversed in Google Play. We connect all these
interesting results to the cross-store differences in terms of aver-
age consumer willingness to pay (Halaburda et al. 2011; Ghose
and Han 2014). Finally, the type of category is also shown to influ-
ence the effects of the revenue model and in-app purchase (the lat-
ter to a lesser extent) on the app revenue performance. In this case,
we explain that the suitability of a revenue model depends on the
app category because different types of apps naturally differ in
terms of complexity, needs and segments to be satisfied. We utilize
our findings to provide useful indications to support app develop-
ers in their decisions about which revenue model to adopt for their
apps and whether to enable in-app purchase or not.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we introduce and discuss our hypotheses by connecting them to
the existing literature and anecdotal evidence from the industry
world. In Section 3, the empirical analysis is presented. Specifically,
we describe the dataset, the explanatory variables and the statisti-
cal methods used in this paper. In Section 4 we present and discuss
the empirical results. Finally, in Section 5 we provide the implica-
tions of our findings for theory and practice and conclude
discussing the limitations of this study and some lines for future
research.2. Theory and hypotheses
The aim of this paper is to study the effects of revenue models
and in-app purchase on app revenue performance, as measured by
the app daily revenue rank, and how such effects are influenced by
the distribution platform where the app is marketed and the type
of category to which the app belongs. Accordingly, we ground on
the vast literature on the choice of online revenue models to com-
pare paid and freemium revenue models, which typically rely on
payments from all or some users, with the free revenue model,
which instead crucially relies on the presence of alternative rev-
enue streams, mainly advertising. By using arguments from the
versioning literature, we also formulate a hypothesis on the effect
of the presence of in-app purchase. Finally, we formulate a number
of hypotheses that suggest how these relationships are contingent
upon the distribution platform as well as the app category. In this
case, we rely on both theoretical arguments and evidence from the
industry world.
Before introducing our hypotheses, it is important to explain
our choice of considering daily revenue ranks as the measure of
app revenue performance. This is because revenue ranks are the
only publicly available information on revenues generated by apps.
In fact, app stores provide rankings (so called top grossing rank-
ings) based on the revenue generated by each app on a daily basis
(Carare 2012; Garg and Telang 2013; Ghose and Han 2014), but do
not reveal (for competitive reasons) any information on the actual
amount of revenue. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, no
commercial database provides this type of data. Hence, using top
revenue ranks appears the only viable approach to measure the
app revenue performance. This choice is further supported by the
copious body of literature that has empirically established a
relationship between ranks and actual sales in online commerce
(Brynjolfsson et al. 2003; Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003) and
specifically in the context of the app market (Garg and Telang2013). As discussed later in greater detail, we utilize such relation-
ship in formulating our regression model, whereas we simply use
the ranks for the Mann–Whitney tests on matched subsamples.
2.1. The relationships between revenue models and revenue
performance: free vs. paid vs. freemium
The study of different revenue models and their effect on firms’
revenue performance has been extensively carried out in the con-
text of information goods and/or EC by a vast and multidisciplinary
literature (Amit and Zott 2001; Gallaugher et al. 2001; Afuah and
Tucci 2003; Chai et al., 2007; Amit and Zott 2008; Enders et al.
2008; Pauwels and Weiss 2008; Clemons 2009; Teece 2010;
Wirtz et al. 2010; Zott et al. 2011; Halbheer et al. 2014; Wagner
et al. 2014). For instance, Pauwels and Weiss (2008) have empiri-
cally investigated the revenue consequences of moving from a pure
free strategy to a paid/freemium strategy for online content provi-
ders, demonstrating that the gain or loss in revenue after the
change in the revenue model depends on a number of factors such
as whether the price is high relatively to the willingness to pay of
users, whether all contents are affected by the change in the strat-
egy, and whether the momentum of new free subscriptions has
been completed. Similarly, Enders et al. (2008) have explored
how different revenue models perform in the context of online
social networks, concluding that the choice of free versus paid
types of revenue models hinges upon the number of users, their
willingness to pay as well as their trust.
Overall, the message provided by the extant literature is that
numerous factors can strongly influence the comparison of
different revenue models in terms of revenue performance, and
thus there is no univocal preference of one revenue model over
the other ones. However, no prior study has addressed such com-
parison in the context of mobile apps. By virtue of its peculiar fea-
tures, which include, among others, the possibility to sell apps of
completely different nature (e.g., games versus utility or navigation
apps) in the same e-marketplace as well as the possibility to cus-
tomize the app, the app store distribution model allows developers
to adopt a variety of online revenue models and strategies for app
monetization. However, this also requires careful decisions to
developers, as choosing the right revenue model for the given
app is crucial for the economic success of the app itself.
We can identify at least three main models utilized by develop-
ers in the app stores. First, some developers adopt a free app strat-
egy, releasing the app for free, and mostly aim at monetizing by
means of advertising and, to less extent, through non-personally
identifiable data selling. We refer to it as a free revenue model. Sec-
ond, other developers market only paid apps and mostly aim at
monetizing by means of app sales. We refer to this option as a paid
revenue model. Finally, some other developers combine ‘‘free” and
‘‘paid” models, by offering both free and paid app versions. Under
this model, a low valuable version, which may include ads and has
limited or time-expiring functionalities/features, is offered for free.
As explained later, in this case the low valuable version can work
as a trial offered to users to experiment with the product before
committing to upgrade upon payment to the high valuable version,
where the above restrictions are significantly reduced, if not totally
eliminated. As a result, some users will purchase and use the high
valuable version, whereas those who decide not to upgrade will
keep using the low valuable version (if not time-expiring) and
be subject to (more) intense advertising. We refer to this option
as a freemium revenue model (Niculescu and Wu 2011; Wagner
et al. 2014).
In the following subsections, we compare these three revenue
models commonly adopted for marketing apps. Specifically, we
formulate our hypotheses comparing paid and freemium models
with the free model. This is because, in line with previous studies
Table 1
Summary of the hypotheses.
Hypothesis Hypothesis statement
H1a Paid apps are associated with better daily revenue ranks than
free apps.
H1b Freemium apps are associated with better daily revenue ranks
than free apps. This improvement in the daily revenue rank is
even higher than that obtained using the paid revenue model,
so that freemium apps are associated with better daily revenue
ranks than paid apps as well.
H2a It is more likely that paid apps are associated with better daily
revenue ranks than free apps in the Apple’s App Store.
H2b It is more likely that freemium apps are associated with better
daily revenue ranks than free apps in the Apple’s App Store.
H3 The effect of the different types of revenue models on app daily
revenue rank depends on the app category.
H4 Apps enabling in-app purchase are associated with better daily
revenue ranks.
H5 The option of in-app purchase is more likely to be effective in
terms of daily revenue rank in the Apple’s App Store than in
Google Play.
H6 The effect of in-app purchase on app daily revenue rank
depends on the app category
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Pauwels and Weiss 2008), we aim to provide developers with
insights on whether they should opt for revenue models (paid or
freemium) that require payments from all or some of the users
for monetization, or utilize the free model thus crucially relying
on other revenue streams, e.g., advertising, in order to monetize
from apps. Moreover, contrasting evidences have emerged from
the industry world. As a matter of fact, while the great popularity
of the free model in the app market has supported since the begin-
ning the belief that such revenue model should be preferred in this
context3, recent industry figures suggest that payment-based mod-
els (paid and freemium) allow developers to better monetize on apps
(Lunden 2013). Therefore, we try to shed light on the correctness of
these opposite evidences by means of rigorous econometric analysis.
At any rate, our statistical analysis considers also the comparison
between paid and freemium models (which is indeed included in
one of our hypotheses). For the sake of clarity, we also summarize
the hypotheses in Table 1.2.1.1. Paid versus free revenue models
As already explained, under a paid app revenue model revenue
mostly accrues from the price each user pays to download the app.
On the other hand, the rationale behind the adoption of a ‘free app’
revenue model is that developers can heavily rely on other revenue
streams, i.e., on revenue generated from transactions with other
parties. Indeed, free apps work as two-sided markets (Rochet and
Tirole 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne 2005). In our context, apps
might attract not only app users, but also third parties who are
interested in app users, when they are available in large numbers,
for business purposes. Some intuitive examples of third parties are
usually firms that are interested in advertising their products
inside the app, i.e., advertisers, but also those in search of con-
sumer information for their marketing purposes, i.e., market info
seekers. In this case, app developers could release the app for free
to users to create a large base of consumers (and thus large base of
data) that can be very appealing to such third parties. As a result,
app users would be subsidized, whereas third parties end up
paying handsomely to advertise inside the app or to obtain
non-personally identifiable information, thus allowing developers
to profit from these revenue streams.3 According to Gartner (2013), 90% of downloads in Apple’s App Store and Google
Play are related to free apps.Numerous sources have argued that digital products should be
accessed for free by final users due to the fact that they can be pro-
duced and commercialized at zero marginal cost and can generate
revenue from other streams, e.g., advertising (Anderson 2009). This
helps explain the large adoption of this revenue model also for
apps (Gartner 2013), which rightly belong to the category of infor-
mation goods. However, others have argued that many firms sell-
ing digital products on the Internet have changed their revenue
model by moving from advertising-only revenue model to
payment-based models at least for part of their product offering
(Pauwels and Weiss 2008). According to theory, the reason is
threefold. First, the free revenue model requires a huge amount
of users (critical mass) to attract a sufficient number of interested
third parties, e.g., primarily advertisers but also info seekers, able
to ensure developers’ profitability (Canzer 2006; Laudon and
Traver 2007; Enders et al. 2008). In the context of apps, this implies
an extremely high number of app downloads to allow developers
to profit from advertising or also info selling. Second, the increased
competition from search engine advertising and other similar
forms has made advertising less and less profitable to providers
of online digital content (Pauwels and Weiss 2008). Third, numer-
ous studies have highlighted the decline in the effectiveness of
advertising on the Internet, which has reduced the appeal of this
type of revenue model (Clemons 2009; Zott et al. 2011). Hence, it
appears intuitive that releasing only a free app may turn out to
be exceedingly risky. On the other hand, the paid revenue model
allows developers to profit directly from app sales without the
need of reaching a huge amount of downloads to make advertising
and similar revenue streams really effective. Indeed, in spite of the
fact that the free revenue model is commonly utilized for app com-
mercialization, industry statistics strongly report that paid apps
generate higher revenue than free apps and are predicted to play
a more prominent role also in the future (Gartner 2013; Lunden
2013). Based on these theoretical arguments and industry
evidence, we posit that paid apps should still guarantee a better
revenue performance and thus be associated with better daily
revenue ranks than apps for which developers have chosen a free
model and thus have decided to rely mostly on advertising.
Accordingly, we formulate the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a). Paid apps are associated with better daily
revenue ranks than free apps.2.1.2. Freemium vs. free revenue models
The freemium revenue model combines aspects of the above
two models as both free and paid versions are provided for the
given app. In this case, firms might take advantage of the presence
of heterogeneous customers in the app market and profit from
price discrimination as well as advertising. Indeed, the free version
could be appealing to lowly valuable customers, who can usually
tolerate the ‘‘nagging” amount of advertising and the presence of
limited or time-expiring features, whereas highly valuable cus-
tomers usually upgrade to the paid version to avoid the hassle of
advertising and have access to more features. Besides favoring
market segmentation, the presence of a free version (in addition
to the paid version) serves also as a mechanism to favor product
trialability. In fact, in this case, the role of the free version is to
let customers test the basic functionalities of the product and
resolve the uncertainty about the real value to them, prior to com-
mitting to purchase and upgrade to the paid version (Rogers 1983;
Moore and Benbasat 1991; Gallaugher and Wang 2002).
As we have already discussed, numerous studies focusing on
online markets have documented the increasing tendency of infor-
mation goods providers to move from pure free model to
payment-based models (Pauwels and Weiss 2008; Clemons 2009;
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base to make the advertising revenue model sustainable. However,
some authors underscore the fact that online consumers have been
used to receive many contents for free and thus may expect to still
have access for free (Wagner et al. 2014). Thus,moving directly from
a completely free revenue model to full paid revenue model may
result in a revenue loss under certain conditions (Pauwels and
Weiss 2008). In the context of apps, this is also likely to be the case
as consumers have been used to have access to free apps since the
launch of app stores (Gordon 2013). On the other hand, by favoring
trialability, price discrimination as well as enabling alternative
revenue streams such as advertising, the freemium revenue model
can better balance between the benefits of both paid and free apps.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, the freemium revenue model should not
only result in a better app revenue performance as compared with
the free revenue model, but also the increase in the performance
relatively to the free revenuemodel should be even higher than that
obtained via the paid revenue model, thus making it the most
preferable revenuemodel. Accordingly,we formulate that freemium
apps should enjoy better daily revenue ranks thanboth free andpaid
apps:
Hypothesis 1b (H1b). Freemium apps are associated with better
daily revenue ranks than free apps. This improvement in the daily
revenue rank is even higher than that obtained using the paid revenue
model, so that freemium apps are associated with better daily revenue
ranks than paid apps as well.2.2. Interaction effect between revenue models and store
The above hypotheses examine the general role of revenuemod-
els in the app revenue performance as measured by the daily rev-
enue rank. However, it is conceivable that the distribution
platformwhere the given app is marketed could play a role in shap-
ing such hypothesized effects. Indeed, the app market is character-
ized by the unique relationship between the mobile OS/device
market and the app market. Once consumers select their favorite
OS/mobile device (e.g., Apple or Android), they can only rely on
the sponsored platform to source their apps, unless they change
their mobile device (which happens rarely, according to Ghose
and Han 2014). This implies that the characteristics of the
customer base in a given app store strictly reflect those of the cus-
tomer base of the associated product, i.e., the mobile device and the
relative OS. As different mobile device makers and/or OS providers
are likely to target different segments based on their product qual-
ity and marketing capabilities, it follows that different app stores
will be accessed by different types of consumers. In particular, with
regard to the two major mobile device ecosystems, it is widely rec-
ognized that Apple targets exclusively the high-end of the market,
whereas the sales of Android devices are mostly determined by
low-end segments of the market (Halaburda et al. 2011; Ghose
and Han 2014; Edwards 2014; Nerney 2014). This implies that con-
sumers accessing the Apple’s App Store are on average more valu-
able than those in Google Play consumers. As a matter of fact,
recent industry evidence shows that, although Google Play gener-
ates 70% more app downloads as compared with Apple’s App Store,
the total revenue is still 70% lower (Sims 2015). Previous research
on online digital content has suggested payment-based revenue
models (e.g., paid or freemium models) are more likely to be suit-
able in presence of consumers displaying sufficiently large willing-
ness to pay for the product (Enders et al. 2008; Pauwels and Weiss
2008). On the other hand, the free revenue model, which relies on
additional revenue streams such as those generated from advertis-
ing, can perform better in presence of low user willingness to pay
but very large user base (Enders et al. 2008; Pauwels and Weiss2008). Therefore, we should expect that the hypothesized prefer-
ence of payments-based models (paid and freemium) over the free
revenue model should be particularly emphasized in Apple’s App
Store, whereas it should be at leastmitigated in Google Play. In turn,
this implies that an increase in the revenue performance due to the
adoption of a paid or a freemium model as compared to the free
model is more likely to be observed in the Apple’s App Store, by vir-
tue of the higher willingness to pay of users accessing this store.
Hence, our hypotheses state:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a). It is more likely that paid apps are associated
with better daily revenue ranks than free apps in the Apple’s App Store.Hypothesis 2b (H2b). It is more likely that freemium apps are asso-
ciated with better daily revenue ranks than free apps in the Apple’s
App Store.2.3. Interaction effect between revenue models and app category
We also investigate the role of the app category in shaping the
hypothesized relationship between the revenue model adopted
for an app and its revenue performance, as measured by the daily
revenue rank. Indeed, there exists a large body of literature demon-
strating that product sales on the Internet depend on the type of
product and its characteristics (Phau and Poon 2000; Grewal et al.
2004). Particularly, products differing in terms of differentiation
or in the degree of sophistication/complexity are likely to result
in different level of purchases on the Internet (Grewal et al. 2004;
Chang et al. 2005). Similarly, prior literature has documented that
different types of products are likely to attract different types of
consumers in terms of purchase behavior and preferences
(Reibstein 2002; Levin et al. 2003; Korgaonkar et al. 2006).
Based on these arguments, it is straightforward that, by attract-
ing different consumer segments as well as by satisfying different
types of needs, different product categories are associated with dif-
ferent consumer willingness to pay. Therefore, it can be easily
argued that not all revenue models are suitable for all product cat-
egories. In particular, the free revenue model should be likely to
perform better for product categories for which users are not very
much willing or have not been traditionally used to spend money,
but from which developers can still derive adequate revenues due
to their feature of being attractive to large number of users and, as
a consequence, to highly valuable third parties such as advertisers.
Examples include news and magazine categories, for which online
providers have traditionally adopted the free revenue model
(Pauwels and Weiss 2008). With regard to apps, these arguments
suggest that the hypothesized increase in the revenue performance
guaranteed by these payment-based models as compared with the
free model should be at least mitigated (if not eliminated or even
reversed) in presence of news and magazine apps. On the other
hand, the paid or the freemium revenue models should be more
suitable for product categories that are likely to be complex and
satisfy more sophisticated needs, thus delivering considerable
value to customers. For this kind of products, consumers are natu-
rally more willing to spend money (Wang et al. 2005). When there
is no uncertainty about the value of the given type of product to
them, they will afford to pay immediately and therefore, the full
paid revenue model is likely to be the most effective. When,
instead, such uncertainty exists and is relevant, they are more
likely to prefer first to experiment with the basic features of the
product before committing to purchase the full version of the
product (Gallaugher and Wang 2002). In this case, the freemium
revenue model is likely to be the most effective to monetize
(Cheng et al. 2015). Utility applications are indicative examples
178 P. Roma, D. Ragaglia / Electronic Commerce Research and Applications 17 (2016) 173–190of categories for which users are willing to pay (sometimes after
experimenting with the product), because of their added value to
consumers (Wang et al. 2005). Based on these considerations, it
appears clear that the app category will shape the efficacy of rev-
enue models in terms of app revenue performance. However, given
the large number of app categories commercialized in major app
stores (in our sample, for instance we count 12 categories), we
do not formulate a priori hypotheses on the relationship between
revenue models and app revenue performance for each specific
category. Rather, we maintain a more general view and posit that
the category certainly plays a role in shaping such relationship.
From a theoretical perspective, it is indeed more interesting to
understand whether the category is influential in the relationship
between revenue models and app revenue performance, rather
than predicting the specific impact of revenue models for each
detailed category. Therefore, we postpone the discussion related
to specific categories to the practical implications section and
formulate our next hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The effect of the different types of revenue models
on app daily revenue rank depends on the app category.2.4. The relationship between in-app purchase and revenue
performance
More and more developers provide app users who have down-
loaded their apps at a given price (or free) with the opportunity to
purchase additional features, e.g., additional levels, or credits in
case of a game, directly inside the app. This practice is known as
in-app purchase. However, it is important to note that in-app pur-
chase does not necessarily coincide with the freemium revenue
model, which implies the release of free version in addition to
the paid version. Rather, it is an additional strategy that can be pur-
sued by developers to better segment and price discriminate
among their customers to the scope of increasing profits. In fact,
in-app purchase provides users with the opportunity to upgrade
to better features and/or download additional functionalities with
additional price charge, irrespective of whether a free version has
been released for the app in addition to the paid version. In other
words, it can be well the case that only the paid version has been
released for the app (for instance at a price equal to $0.99) and in-
app purchases are offered to add additional features at incremental
prices. Essentially, in-app purchase can exist also in absence of a
free version, which instead is necessary part of the freemium
revenue model.
From a theoretical perspective, in-app purchase can be assimi-
lated to versioning and upgrading. Numerous theoretical studies
have studied the economic implications of the use of a versioning
strategy for information goods, suggesting that versioning can be
optimal in presence of consumer heterogeneity (Shapiro and
Varian 1999; Bhargava and Choudhary, 2001, 2008). For instance,
Bhargava and Choudhary (2008) demonstrate the optimality of
versioning when the lower quality version is designed in a way
that, relative to their valuations for the high-end version, highly
valuable consumers have a lower relative valuation for the lower
quality than do lowly valuable consumers (Bhargava and
Choudhary, 2008). More recently, Wei and Nault (2013) study a
setting where consumers can purchase low or high quality versions
of the product and, in case they opt for the low quality version,
they still have the opportunity to upgrade to the high quality ver-
sion at a certain price. They show that versioning is optimal under
this version-to-upgrade setting, with some consumers that will
upgrade to the high quality version after purchasing the low qual-
ity version. The same authors show that versioning is optimal also
when consumers have both group and individual tastes for quality(Wei and Nault 2014). Finally, versioning has been found optimal
in presence of piracy (Wu and Chen 2008).
Overall, the above theoretical studies predict that under certain
conditions pursuing a versioning strategy is suitable for informa-
tion goods as it helps profit from price discrimination. Basic indus-
try figures seems to suggest that this is likely to be the case in the
context of apps as in-app purchase has been successful in the
Apple’s App Store, and it has reached large popularity in Google
Play as well (Gartner 2013). Thus, both from theoretical and indus-
try evidence viewpoints, it seems reasonable to expect that, ceteris
paribus, apps enabling in-app purchase are more likely to be asso-
ciated with higher revenue as a result of a finer-grained segmenta-
tion in the market, and thus be better ranked than apps offering no
in-app purchase. Accordingly, we formulate the following:
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Apps enabling in-app purchase are associated
with better daily revenue ranks.2.5. Interaction effect between in-app purchase and store
The above hypothesis suggests that we should expect better
revenue performance, as measured by the app daily revenue rank,
for apps enabling in-app purchase. Here, similarly to the case of
revenue models, we argue that the extent of the effect of in-app
purchase on app revenue performance should be contingent upon
the distribution platform where the app is commercialized. As a
matter of fact, the same theoretical arguments discussed above
for the revenue models apply also to the case of in-app purchase.
In fact, in-app purchase as a practice of price discrimination
requires heterogeneous consumers with some consumers willing
to spend significantly more than others to upgrade to the more
valuable app functionalities/features. Thus, in-app purchase is
more likely to be effective when the consumer segments display-
ing large willingness to pay are of considerable size (Enders et al.
2008). As we have highlighted above, consumers accessing the
Apple’s App Store are on average more valuable than those in Goo-
gle Play (Ghose and Han 2014; Sims 2015). Hence it is conceivable
to expect that in-app purchase is more likely to be effective in
terms of revenue performance in the Apple’s App Store than in
Google Play, given the presence of more valuable users in the for-
mer store. Hence, we formulate our fifth hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 5 (H5). The option of in-app purchase is more likely to be
effective in terms of daily revenue rank in the Apple’s App Store than in
Google Play.2.6. Interaction effect between in-app purchase and app category
In addition to the role of the distribution platform, we argue
that the category to which an app belongs also influences the rela-
tionship between in-app purchase and the app revenue perfor-
mance as measured by the app daily revenue rank. Once again,
the same arguments discussed for revenue models apply also to
the case of in-app purchase. In fact, as discussed earlier, to guaran-
tee enhanced profitability, in-app purchase requires the presence
of considerably large consumer heterogeneity in terms of willing-
ness to pay, with some consumers willing to spend more for
upgraded features. Intuitively, products of very different categories
have different nature, which may result in user segments with sig-
nificantly different purchase behavior, willingness to pay, needs to
satisfy (Levin et al. 2003; Grewal et al. 2004; Reibstein, 2002;
Wang et al. 2005). Therefore, consumer heterogeneity in terms of
willingness to pay is likely to differ across categories. Conse-
quently, price discrimination can be more effectively practiced
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being less suitable for categories attracting more homogenous con-
sumers. Similarly to the case of revenue models, given the large
number of app categories commercialized in major app stores,
we do not formulate a priori hypotheses on the relationship
between in-app purchase and app revenue performance for each
specific category. Rather, we formulate our next hypothesis by
positing that the category influences the relationship between
in-app purchase and app revenue performance, leaving room for
the discussion on specific categories in the practical implications:
Hypothesis 6 (H6). The effect of in-app purchase on app daily
revenue rank depends on the app category.53. The empirical analysis
3.1. Data and Variables
In order to test our hypotheses, we collected data of apps for
smartphones by weekly exploring the Italian version of the two
major app stores, namely Apple’s App Store and Google Play.
Specifically, every Friday, we recorded data from a random sample
of apps retrieved from the top 200 grossing apps ranking publicly
available in these two stores.4 In case an app was no longer listed
among the top 200 apps in the relative store in subsequent observa-
tions, the actual ranking was retrieved from appannie.com, a well-
known website providing the entire history of official app rankings
and statistics. The choice of considering top app rankings is in line
with previous literature, given that the majority of apps available
in the app stores are definitely not displayed to consumers (Carare
2012). It is also important to clarify that, according to the available
sources, top grossing app rankings are based on the total daily (not
cumulated) revenue of an app including revenue from sales, in-app
purchase and advertising (Carare 2012; Garg and Telang 2013;
Ghose and Han 2014). The fact that the rankings are based on daily,
rather than aggregate, app revenue allowed us to concentrate on a
specific day and thus reduce collection effort that was mostly carried
out manually, while still maintaining a sufficiently large observation
period. As a matter of fact, the observations utilized in the present
paper are related to all Fridays in the period going from October
19th, 2012 to March 8th, 2013 (20 weeks in total). There are three
reasons behind this choice. First, we wanted to reduce the extremely
significant data collection effort, which was very intense as the col-
lection process could only be performed manually for most of the
variables of interests and the controls. Second, after preliminary
analysis we noticed that observing data once a week allowed us to
appreciate changes in the rank of apps. Third, the choice of Friday
as a representative day of the week is due to the fact in a preliminary
analysis it largely reflected the behavior of the other days. Therefore,
there would not be much difference if other days of the week were
chosen. At any rate, as we discuss in the concluding section, future
research could look at different days or incorporate more days in a
week by diminishing the number of weeks of observation.
In our preliminary analysis, we randomly selected 50 apps from
each of the two top 200 grossing rankings, so that we had initially
100 apps to be observed. However, when the observation period
actually began, 9 apps from App Store and 1 app from Google Play
were no longer among the top 200 grossing apps of the respective
stores. Therefore, we randomly added 10 (9 from the App Store and
1 from Google Play) apps sharing the same characteristics of those
apps. Recording data from the two stores for all the 20 weeks4 Considering a random sample naturally helps reduce potential selection bias in
the choice of the top grossing apps. Moreover, we later provide evidence that other
potential bias concerns are very limited (if not absent at all) in our sample.would yield a balanced panel dataset of 2200 observations related
to 59 apps from app store and 51 apps from Google Play. However,
during our period of observation, four apps were eliminated by the
store where they were available for download, thus leading to a
slightly unbalanced panel dataset counting 2177 observations.
Finally, it is important to underline that our sample does not
include e-service apps, i.e., those apps operating as a new channel
to facilitate consumers’ purchase of a certain product/service that
has been normally transacted via seller’s website or physical store.
Examples include apps marketed by airlines. These types of apps
are naturally free, as the developer does not market the app to
make money out of it. Rather, these apps serve to facilitate service
acquisition and increase customer loyalty. These types of apps
were never in the top 200 grossing rankings during our period of
observation. Also, it is important to highlight that our sample
includes only the paid version of freemium apps, and never the rel-
ative free version, as the latter did not appear in the top 200 gross-
ing ranking during our observation period. In fact, all free apps in
our sample do not have a corresponding paid version, whereas
some paid apps in our sample have a corresponding a free version.
Therefore, we study the effect of the freemium model on the daily
revenue rank of the paid version, not of the free version, which,
based on our data, was not as successful as the paid version.
We defined a set of variables of interest and some controls to
test the formulated hypotheses and recorded the relative data.
They are reported in Table 2, which provides a brief description
and the modalities of all the variables. Table 3 shows the descrip-
tive statistics. In the interest of length, we only discuss descriptive
statistics related to our variables of interest. First, with regard to
our dependent variable, the average revenue rank of apps in our
sample is 240, with the highest rank being the first position and
the lowest rank being the 1000th position, with no relevant
changes across the two stores, i.e., Apple’s App Store and Google
Play.5 With regard to our main independent variables, not surpris-
ingly, releasing free apps is the most popular top grossing revenue
model (53.88% of the occurrences), followed by the paid (27.38%)
and freemium (18.74%) revenue models, respectively, as shown in
column A of Table 3. In addition, developers of more than two third
of the apps utilize the practice of in-app purchase. Moreover, from
columns B and C of Table 3, only minor differences seem to emerge
with the regard to the distribution of revenue models as well as in-
app purchase across the two stores, except for the freemium revenue
model, which accounts for 28.71% of the observations in Google Play,
while accounting for 10.22% in Apple’s App Store. With regard to the
app category popularity, column A of Table 3 shows, as expected,
that Games are undoubtedly the most popular app category with
about 57.74% of our observations, whereas all the remaining cate-
gories display percentages less than 10%. Interestingly, columns B
and C of Table 3 also show high similarity of the two stores (Apple’s
App Store and Google Play) in terms of distribution of apps across
categories. Such high similarity, together with our choice of using
a randomly selected sample from the two stores, increases our con-
fidence that the impact of any potential bias due to endogenous
decisions of developers is very limited, at least in our sample. In fact,
one may argue that certain categories are more popular in one store
rather than the other one as a result of developers’ decisions to
develop and commercialize certain apps in certain stores. On a the-
oretical basis, this may have impact on the reliability of our findings
if certain categories turn out to be systematically more successful
than others. However, given that the distribution of the categoriesNote that our sample did consist of apps initially ranked among the first 200 apps
by revenue (either when selecting the initial sample or at the moment of first
observation). However, during the period of observation some apps could naturally
lose positions and be ranked in lower positions. This explains why the average rank is
actually 240 and the minimum rank is 1000.
Table 2
Variables description.
Variables Description
Dependent variable
Rank Positive integer variable indicating the rank of the given
app in the given week in the specific store
Variables of interest
Free Binary variable equal to 1 if the app is free in the given
week and no paid version is available in the given week
of observation; 0 otherwise. This variable is chosen as a
baseline in the regression analysis and thus it is removed
due to perfect collinearity with Freemium and Paid
Freemium Binary variable equal to 1 if both paid and free versions
(the latter either time-expiring or with limited
functionalities, and possibly displaying advertisements)
are available in the given week of observation; 0
otherwise
Paid Binary variable equal to 1 if the app is paid and no free
version is available in the given week of observation; 0
otherwise
In-app Binary variable equal to 1 if the app enables in-app
purchase of optional features in the given week; 0
otherwise
Control variables
App category 12 binary variables (Customizations; Education;
Entertainment; Games; Healthcare & Fitness; Money &
Finance; Music; News & Magazines; Photo & Video;
Social Network; Travel & Navigation; Utility), each equal
to 1 if the app belongs to the respective category; 0
otherwise. The dummy Games is chosen as a baseline in
the regression analysis and thus it is removed due to
perfect collinearity with the other category dummies
Company fame Binary variable equal to 1 the app developer is a
developer with fully established reputation worldwide; 0
otherwise. Based on revenue information and worldwide
recognition, we identify 9 top developers in our sample,
i.e., Apple, Disney, Electronic Arts, Gameloft, Popcap,
Rockstar Games, Sega, Ubisoft, and Zynga. We also
include Garmin, Marvel Entertainment, Norton by
Symantec and TomTom due to their huge popularity
Developer type Binary variable equal to 1 if the app is developed by a
firm; 0 if developed by individual(s)
High app rating Binary variable equal to 1 if, in the given week and store,
the app rating was greater or equal to 4 stars. The high
threshold is due to the fact that the great majority of
apps in our sample had no low rating
New entries Positive integer variable indicating the number of new
entries in the top 200 ranking in the given week in the
specific store
Number
developer
Apps
Positive integer variable indicating the number of apps
marketed by the developer of the given app in the given
week in the given store
Size Continuous variable measuring the size (in Mbytes) of
the app in the given week
Store Binary variable equal to 1 if the app is observed in the
App Store; 0 if observed in Google Play
Time since
market launch
Positive integer variable measuring the time (in months)
since the market launch of the given app
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ited (if any) impact of potential bias concerns. Columns D-N of
Table 3 show that in-app purchase is utilized under all three revenue
models (i.e., paid, free, freemium) adopted by developers. Specifi-
cally, almost all free apps in our sample enable in-app purchase
(out of 53.88% observations of free apps, 53.28% are related to free
apps with in-app purchase), whereas this practice is implemented
in approximately half of paid apps (out of 27.38% observations of
paid apps, 13.63% are related to paid apps with in-app purchase)
and only 9.8% of freemium apps (1.84% out of 18.74%). In this case,
there are some differences between the two stores, especially with
regard to the percentages of paid and freemium apps giving users
the in-app purchase opportunity. Finally, Table 3 provides detailed
information about the distribution of free, paid and freemium
revenue models as well as in-app purchase across differentcategories. Without any loss of generality, in the regression analysis,
the variables Games and Free are considered as baselines for category
and revenue model variables and thus are removed from the regres-
sion analysis given their perfect collinearity with respective category
and revenue model variables (Roma et al., 2013). More importantly,
note that our preliminary analysis suggests that there are no serious
concerns of multicollinearity that can affect the results. Finally, note
also that the introduction of the interaction terms as well as the
dummy Store allows us to correctly test our hypotheses by mitigat-
ing potential issues implied by the fact that our dependent variable,
i.e., the daily revenue rank, is a relative measure of revenue perfor-
mance and there might exist differences of the two platforms in
terms of total revenue generated by each store.
3.2. Methods
We utilize two different empirical approaches to test our
hypotheses and show that ourmajor findings are essentially consis-
tent across these approaches, thus increasing our confidence about
the main implications of this study. Specifically, our first approach
is to test the hypotheses via a standard random effect regression
model for panel data. The second approach consists of testing our
hypotheses by means of the Mann–Whitney non-parametric test,
which is performed after applying the Propensity Score Matching
(PSM) method (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1984). The PSM technique is important due to the univariate
nature of the Mann–Whitney test. Indeed, it serves to generate sub-
samples of apps that are similar in all the other relevant character-
istics not included in the Mann–Whitney test and thus can help
mitigate potential bias concerns related to the use of such test. In
the following subsections we provide the description of our two
approaches, while in Section 4 we present and discuss the findings
showing that the two approaches yield consistent results.
3.2.1. Regression analysis
As our dataset is a slightly unbalanced panel and the number of
statistic units (apps) is quite large compared to the observation
period (number of weeks), three basic regression models, namely
pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects models, are usually
suggested in the econometrics literature (Wooldridge 2002).
However, the fixed effects model should not be appropriate a priori
in our setting because some variables of interest, e.g., store and
categories, are time invariant. They would be eliminated due to
perfect collinearity if fixed effects model were adopted. Therefore,
we preliminarily compare pooled OLS and random effects models
to analyze the effects of all explanatory and control variables. In
all the cases, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test strongly
indicates the presence of random effects (as reported below
Table 4). Therefore, to opportunely test our hypotheses, the follow-
ing standard random effects regression model is considered in this
paper (for the sake of presentation we report the model including
the interactions of the revenue models with the dummy Store; the
model including the interactions of the revenue models with the
category dummies can be derived similarly):
Rankaijt ¼ aþ ðb1 þ b2  StorejÞ  Paidijt þ ðc1 þ c2  StorejÞ
 Freemiumijt þ ðd1 þ d2  StorejÞ  In appijt þU
 Controlsijt þmij þ eijt ð1Þ
In (1), subscript i indicates the app, j the store, and t the week of
observation. The exponent a is the shape parameter of the power
law function linking app sales (in value) to app daily revenue rank.
The power law relationship between sales (in value) and ranks has
been empirically demonstrated by the copious body of literature in
online commerce (e.g., Brynjolfsson et al. 2003; Chevalier and
Goolsbee 2003) and also specifically in the context of the app
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics.
A B C D E F G H I L M N O P Q
Free Paid Freemium In-app
Total Apple Google Total Apple Google Total Apple Google Total Apple Google Total Apple Google
Free 53.88% 57.32% 49.85%
Paid 27.38% 32.45% 21.44%
Freemium 18.74% 10.22% 28.71%
In-app 69.59% 71.55% 67.30% 53.28% 56.22% 49.85% 14.47% 13.63% 15.45% 1.84% 1.70% 1.99%
Games 57.74% 59.11% 56.13% 45.02% 47.70% 41.87% 8.68% 9.71% 7.48% 4.04% 1.70% 6.78% 53.05% 56.22% 49.35%
Social network 4.59% 5.11% 3.99% 3.67% 3.41% 3.99% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.92% 1.70% 0.00% 4.59% 5.11% 3.99%
Money & finance 0.92% 0.00% 1.99% 0.00% – 0.00% 0.00% – 0.00% 0.92% – 1.99% 0.00% – 0.00%
Photo & video 4.59% 6.81% 1.99% 0.60% 1.11% 0.00% 3.99% 5.71% 1.99% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.92% 1.70% 0.00%
Entertainment 0.92% 1.70% 0.00% 0.92% 1.70% – 0.00% 0.00% – 0.00% 0.00% – 0.92% 1.70% –
Education 3.67% 3.41% 3.99% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.84% 3.41% 0.00% 1.84% 0.00% 3.99% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Healthcare &
fitness
0.92% 0.00% 1.99% 0.00% – 0.00% 0.00% – 0.00% 0.92% – 1.99% 0.00% – 0.00%
Music 2.76% 5.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% – 0.00% 0.00% – 2.76% 5.11% – 0.00% 0.00% –
News &
magazines
3.67% 5.11% 1.99% 2.76% 3.41% 1.99% 0.92% 1.70% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 2.76% 3.41% 1.99%
Utility 7.35% 6.81% 7.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.67% 6.81% 0.00% 3.67% 0.00% 7.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Customizations 3.67% 1.70% 5.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.84% 1.70% 1.99% 1.84% 0.00% 3.99% 0.92% 1.70% 0.00%
Travel &
navigations
9.19% 5.11% 13.95% 0.92% 0.00% 1.99% 6.43% 3.41% 9.97% 1.84% 1.70% 1.99% 6.43% 1.70% 11.96%
Binary variables Descr. Stat. Binary Variables Descr. Stat.
Total Apple Google Total Apple Google
Store 53.93% 100.00% 0.00% Developer Type 97.24% 98.30% 96.01%
Company fame 21.77% 22.06% 21.44% High App Rating 78.41% 75.21% 82.15%
Continuous/discrete variables Descriptive Statistics
Total Apple Google
Mean Std.D. Min Max Mean Std.D. Min Max Mean Std.D. Min Max
New entries 44.71 15.88 0.00 90.00 48.55 12.44 0.00 60.00 40.21 18.13 0.00 90.00
Number developer apps 22.15 37.63 1.00 168.00 28.16 47.57 1.00 168.00 15.12 18.27 1.00 69.00
Size 141.55 354.71 0.02 2355.20 187.12 373.67 1.00 2007.04 88.21 323.27 0.02 2355.20
Time since market launch (months) 13.17 9.11 0.00 45.00 16.13 11.01 0.00 45.00 9.70 4.01 1.00 25.00
Rank 239.91 282.18 1.00 1000.00 244.45 299.47 1.00 1000.00 234.59 260.25 2.00 1000.00
Note that the statistics are computed using all 2177 observations for columns designated as ‘‘Total”, whereas are computed using only the observations from Apple’s App
Store (1174) for the columns designated as ‘‘Apple” and only those from Google Play (1003) for the columns designated as ‘‘Google”. Also note that the sign – indicates that it
does not make sense to compute the statistics. For instance, the percentage of free apps in the category ‘‘Money & Finance” in Apple’s App Store cannot be computed because
there no apps in such category in Apple’s App Store.
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ies, the use of the power law function linking sales and ranks is a
powerful way to capture the revenue performance in absence of
direct knowledge on revenue (which is indeed our case). Therefore,
we take advantage of the strong evidence provided by previous lit-
erature on the power law relationship between sales and ranks and
adopt this transformation as a dependent variable, instead of using
the mere rank. Specifically, in the paper we present the results
derived from our regression analysis for different values for the
parameter a, which are consistent with the recent work of Garg
and Telang (2013) conducted specifically in the app market. At
any rate, it is noteworthy that the use of other values for this
parameter leads to robust results. Moreover, note that when taking
the alternative approach (i.e., the Mann–Whitney tests on matched
subsamples), we simply use the mere ranks (instead of the power
law transformation). This allows us to verify robustness of the find-
ings obtained using the regression model.
With regard to the other elements in (1), Controlsijt stands for
the vector of control variables reported in Table 2 (U is the vector
of the relative coefficients), which we utilize under the different
models we perform. On the other hand, mij and eijt are the app-
store random effect and error terms, respectively.
3.2.2. Mann–Whitney tests
Our second empirical approach is to perform the Mann–
Whitney test for each of our variables of interest, after opportunely
controlling for the remaining relevant factors that may influencethe app revenue performance, as measured by the app daily rev-
enue rank. The Mann–Whitney test (sometimes also referred to
as Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test) is the non-parametric alterna-
tive to the independent sample t-test. It is used to test whether
two samples come from the same population against the alterna-
tive hypothesis that the observations in one of the two samples
tend to have higher values than the observations in the other sam-
ple. Specifically, this test compares two subgroups (e.g., paid apps
vs. free apps, or apps with in-app purchase vs. apps without in-app
purchase) in terms of the dependent variable (the revenue rank in
our case) by ranking the units of the two subsamples and comput-
ing for all possible combinations the number of times that higher
values (i.e., better revenue ranks) are observed in the first subsam-
ple and the number of times that higher values (i.e., better revenue
ranks) are observed in the second subsample. The minimum of
these two numbers is then compared with the threshold values
of statistical tables of the Mann–Whitney test or with its normal
approximation (z) as implemented by major statistical software
packages. If the p-value corresponding to the z value is higher than
0.05 (or 0.1 if we want to be less restrictive), the hypothesis that
the two subsamples come from the same distribution cannot be
rejected. Vice versa, if the corresponding p-value is lower than
0.05 (or 0.1), we can conclude that one of the two subsamples
has larger values (i.e., better rank in our case) than the other. The
test also provides the probability that one subsample is associated
with larger values (better revenue ranks in our case) than the other
subsample.
Table 4
Results under Random Effects regression models (a = 0.6).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coefficient Std. errors Coefficient Std. errors Coefficient Std. errors
Controls Developer type 0.0070 (0.0211) 0.0093 (0.0158) 0.0213 (0.0216)
Number developer apps 0.0014⁄⁄⁄ (0.0003) 0.0014⁄⁄⁄ (0.0003) 0.0014⁄⁄⁄ (0.0003)
Company fame 0.0177⁄⁄ (0.0065) 0.0211⁄⁄ (0.0069) 0.0226⁄⁄ (0.0075)
Size 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
New entries 0.0001⁄⁄ (0.0000) 0.0001⁄⁄ (0.0000) 0.0001⁄⁄ (0.0000)
Time since Mkt launch 0.0029⁄⁄⁄ (0.0008) 0.0030⁄⁄⁄ (0.0008) 0.0030⁄⁄⁄ (0.0008)
High app rating 0.0029 (0.0062) 0.0024 (0.0063) 0.0026 (0.0063)
Store 0.0739⁄⁄ (0.0236) 0.0680⁄⁄ (0.0225) 0.0848⁄⁄ (0.0258)
Social network 0.0528⁄ (0.0222) 0.0531⁄ (0.0226) 0.0631⁄⁄ (0.0228)
Money & finance 0.0265+ (0.0158) 0.0155 (0.0156) 0.0495⁄⁄ (0.0155)
Photo & video 0.0534⁄ (0.0264) 0.0486⁄ (0.0215) 0.1344⁄⁄ (0.0430)
Entertainment 0.1076⁄⁄⁄ (0.0307) 0.1144⁄⁄⁄ (0.0323) 0.1206⁄⁄⁄ (0.0326)
Education 0.0163 (0.0166) 0.0054 (0.0171) 0.0446+ (0.0228)
Healthcare & fitness 0.0234 (0.0169) 0.0345⁄ (0.0165) 0.0007 (0.0161)
Music 0.0633+ (0.0368) 0.0162 (0.0350) 0.0535 (0.0365)
News & magazines 0.0265 (0.0317) 0.0216 (0.0277) 0.0163 (0.0331)
Utility 0.0280 (0.0268) 0.0135 (0.0215) 0.0935⁄⁄ (0.0360)
Customizations 0.0006 (0.0366) 0.0232 (0.0314) 0.0733⁄⁄ (0.0228)
Travel & navigations 0.0283 (0.0193) 0.0022 (0.0170) 0.0053 (0.0375)
H1a/b Freemium 0.0468⁄ (0.0210) 0.0479⁄ (0.0208) 0.0380 (0.0253)
Paid 0.0330⁄⁄⁄ (0.0089) 0.0098 (0.0171) 0.0203 (0.0282)
H2a/b Freemium X store 0.0828⁄⁄ (0.0322)
Paid X store 0.0460⁄ (0.0184)
H3 Freemium X Social 0.0948⁄⁄ (0.0295)
Freemium X education 0.0591⁄ (0.0270)
Freemium X utility 0.1255⁄⁄ (0.0378)
Freemium X customizations 0.0469 (0.0309)
Freemium X travel & navigations 0.0342 (0.0399)
Paid X photo & video 0.0623⁄ (0.0280)
Paid X news & magazines 0.0916⁄ (0.0426)
Paid X travel & navigations 0.0215 (0.0283)
H4 In-app 0.0573⁄⁄ (0.0216) 0.0523⁄⁄ (0.0193) 0.0030 (0.0259)
H5 In-app X store 0.1524⁄⁄⁄ (0.0277)
H6 In-app X photo & video 0.0665 (0.0418)
In-app X customizations 0.1194⁄⁄ (0.0376)
In-app X travel & navigations 0.0050 (0.0382)
Constant 0.0573⁄⁄ (0.0216) 0.1539⁄⁄⁄ (0.0340) 0.1407⁄⁄⁄ (0.0391)
Note: + p < 0.10, ⁄ p < 0.05, ⁄⁄ p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001. Number of obs.: 2177. Number of apps: 110. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects: v2 1(2)[3] = 2422.92 (2685.16) [2462.1], p = 0.0 (p = 0.0) [p = 0.0] for models 1 (2), and [3], respectively. Note
that all the interactions not reported in the table were deleted either because of perfect multicollinearity or because of the absence of the given revenue model and/or in-app
purchase in the selected category.
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ysis as it allows us to statistically compare couples of subsamples
of apps utilizing different revenue models and compare the two
subsamples of apps enabling in-app purchase and apps without
in-app purchase. However, the main issue behind the use of
Mann–Whitney is that such test considers only one variable at a
time. That is, differently from a regression analysis, it tests the
effect of a variable without taking into account other covariates
that can also potentially affect the dependent variable. In setting
where data are not derived from a controlled experiment, it is cru-
cial to control for all covariates that are relevant in determining the
dependent variable. This is because it may happen that results will
be considerably biased, if excluded covariates display certain
degree of correlation with the variables considered in the analysis.
For instance, a simple comparison of the revenue performance of
paid apps vs. free apps via the Mann–Whitney may not reveal
the true effect of the revenue model, and thus it may yield totally
biased results if the revenue model displays certain degree of
correlation with other variables (e.g., app category or the number
of apps marketed by the given developer, etc. . .). Indeed, the
Mann–Whitney may end up attributing a certain effect to the
considered variable (paid vs. free revenue models), while in real-
ity such effect is due to factors that are not controlled for in theanalysis. The regression analysis helps mitigate (if not solve) this
problem because it allows including in the regression model a wide
range of binary, discrete, and continuous variables, in addition to
that of our interest. The Mann–Whitney is instead a univariate type
of analysis. To render the Mann–Whitney really suitable to our
purposes and avoid considerable bias concerns, we then need to
apply the test to subsamples of our main sample that are generated
by opportunely controlling for the other relevant factors not con-
sidered in the non-parametric test. This can be done by using the
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) technique (Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983, 1984). This class of methods is commonly utilized
when researchers want to evaluate the impact of a treatment
applied to statistical units in absence of controlled experiments.
In this case, units receiving a treatment (for instance, apps for
which the developer has adopted the paid revenue model) and
those receiving the alternative treatment (for instance, apps for
which the developer has adopted the free revenue model) may dif-
fer not only in their treatment status (paid vs. free) but also in
other characteristics potentially correlated to both treatment sta-
tus and the outcome of interest (app revenue performance in our
case). To avoid the biases that this may generate, matching algo-
rithms find a non-treated (or alternatively treated) unit that is sim-
ilar to a treated unit across several dimensions (or characteristics)
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ity. Essentially, these matching algorithms associate two statistical
units different in terms of treatment (the variable object of study),
but being similar for the remaining relevant characteristics. For
instance, if we aim at comparing paid vs. free apps (where paid
revenue model is the treatment and the free revenue model is
the non-treatment or the alternative treatment), the PSM tech-
nique couples paid apps with free apps based on the similarity they
show in terms of the remaining relevant characteristics, such as
the size of the app, the category, the type of developer, and all
the other variables that we controlled for in the regression analy-
sis. After applying the PSM technique, we are provided with a sub-
sample consisting of couples of free and paid apps that are similar
in terms of the relevant characteristics except for the revenue
model (paid vs. free). At this point, the Mann–Whitney test can
be performed on the subsample to understand which revenue
model yields better revenue performance. Indeed, after applying
the PSM technique we can be sufficiently confident the comparison
would not yield biased results as the other relevant characteristics
have been controlled for before running the non-parametric test
and thus the apps in the subsamples considerably differ for the
revenue model but not for the other relevant characteristics.
Therefore, our second approach consists of performing Mann–
Whitney tests for all the variables of interest on subsamples gener-
ated applying the PSM technique in order to reduce the risk that
our results will be biased. Specifically, we performed the Mann–
Whitney test on one-to-one matched subsamples to compare paid
vs. free apps, freemium vs. free apps, freemium vs. paid apps, apps
with in-app purchase vs. apps without in-app purchase in both
Apple’s App Store and Google and for each category (when compar-
ison can be made). With regard to the PSM technique, to ensure a
more rigorous one-to-one matching, we applied PSM matching
within strata. That is, we considered exact matching within app
categories and store, and then within each of these strata, we con-
sidered all the other remaining characteristics to further match
treated and non-treated apps based on the propensity score mea-
sure. For instance, we matched a game app only with the most sim-
ilar game app (based on the propensity score). Also, we imposed a
common support (overlap condition) with no-replacement by
removing treatment observations for which the propensity score
was higher than the maximum or less than the minimum of the
score of non-treatment observations.
4. Results
We present the results of our regression models in Tables 4–6.
Each table refer to a different value of parameter a. Specifically, a
is set to be equal to 0.6, 0.8 and 0.4 in Tables 4–6, respectively. Each
of these tables includes three different models. Model 1 does not
include any interaction variable, Model 2 include the set of interac-
tions of the revenue models and the in-app purchase with the dis-
tribution platform, i.e. the dummy variable Store. In Model 3 we
include the set of interactions of the variables related to the rev-
enue models and in-app purchase with the categories’ variables.6
To better understand the results in Tables 4–6, it is helpful to recall
that in Model 2 the interaction terms of the revenue models and
in-app purchase with the variable Store reflect the effect of such6 We do not present the model including both sets of interactions simultaneously
because this would determine a regression model with a very large number of
interactions (given the number of observations at our disposal), which, as it is well
known, unavoidably increases multi-collinearity, thus resulting in reduced signifi-
cance of coefficients. Therefore, in this case, it is reasonable to rely on separate models
to study and provide the relative implications on how decisions on revenue models
and in-app purchase are contingent upon the distribution platform as well as the app
nature. At any rate, the results under the full model are shown to be reasonably
robust, in spite the diminished levels of significance in some circumstances.variables in Apple’s App Store (Store = 1), whereas the direct terms
of such variables reflect the effect of the same variables in Google
Play (Store = 0). Regarding the interactions of the revenue models
and in-app purchase with category variables, they should be inter-
preted as the effect of such variables in each respective category.
In Table 7, we instead present the results of the Mann–Whitney
tests performed on matched subsamples. Specifically, we include
the hypotheses to be tested and the relative variables, the z-
statistics and the corresponding p-value, which indicates whether
the null hypothesis that two considered subsamples come from the
same distribution can be accepted or not. In addition, it is provided
the probability that one subsample has larger values (i.e., better
revenue ranks) than the other, thus providing, in case of rejection
of the null hypothesis, indication on which subsample displays
better revenue ranks.
To present and discuss the results we take into account both
types of analyses as they are shown to be largely consistent with
each other. The positive and significant coefficient of the Paid
dummy in Model 1 of Tables 4–6 would seem to suggest that the
paid revenue model is associated with higher top grossing ranks
than the free revenue model. In the same vein, the positive coeffi-
cient of the Freemium dummy would seem to suggest that this rev-
enue model has a positive impact on app revenue performance as
compared with the pure free model.
However, from Model 1 it is not clear whether this result is
valid irrespective of the store where apps are marketed or rather
the effect depends (and thus may change depending) on the store.
To better shed light on this result (related to H1a and H1b) as well
as to test hypotheses H2a and H2b, we introduce interaction terms
of the revenue models variables with the Store dummy (as done in
Model 2). The regression results reported in Model 2 of Tables 4–6
show that these effects actually strongly depend on the distribu-
tion platform where the given app is commercialized. Specifically,
the positive and significant coefficients of the interaction terms of
both paid and freemium models with the dummy Store suggest
that in the Apple’s App Store both freemium and paid models are
confirmed to improve the revenue performance as compared with
the free model. This is further confirmed by the Mann–Whitney
tests performed in Table 7. Indeed, in the Apple’s App Store we
can strongly reject the hypothesis that paid and freemium apps
have similar revenue performance to that of free apps (p-values
equal to 0.003 and 0.000). Rather, the fact that probability of
observing better revenue ranks for free apps is quite lower than
½ in both cases (last column of Table 7) confirms that paid and
freemium apps are associated with better ranks and thus superior
revenue performance than free apps. No significant difference in
terms app revenue ranks is instead shown between paid and free-
mium apps in the Apple’s App Store. Indeed, the non-significance
of the Mann–Whitney test performed comparing matched subsam-
ples of freemium and paid apps implies that we cannot reject that
the two revenue models lead to statistically similar revenue per-
formance in the Apple’s App Store.
As for the store Google Play, Model 2 in Tables 4–6 show that
paid and free revenue models do not differ significantly in terms
of app revenue performance. In fact, after introducing the interac-
tion, the coefficient of the Paid dummy, which indeed represents
the effect of the paid revenue model in Google Play as compared
with the free revenue model, is not significant. In this case, the
Mann–Whitney test in Table 7 provides a different result, showing
that we can reject the hypothesis that paid and free apps display
similar revenue performance (p-value equal to 2.18%). Indeed, it
is shown that free apps are less likely to display better revenue
ranks than paid apps. However, given that the two types of analy-
ses provide contrasting results, no clear indication can be drawn
with regard to the preference of paid vs. free models. More inter-
estingly, the comparison of freemium and free revenue models in
Table 5
Results under Random Effects regression models (a = 0.4).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coefficient Std. errors Coefficient Std. errors Coefficient Std. errors
Controls Developer type 0.0097 (0.0304) 0.0171 (0.0255) 0.0278 (0.0340)
Number developer apps 0.0019⁄⁄⁄ (0.0004) 0.0019⁄⁄⁄ (0.0004) 0.0019⁄⁄⁄ (0.0004)
Company fame 0.0262⁄⁄ (0.0099) 0.0324⁄⁄ (0.0105) 0.0347⁄⁄ (0.0115)
Size 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0001 (0.0001)
New entries 0.0002⁄⁄⁄ (0.0001) 0.0002⁄⁄⁄ (0.0001) 0.0002⁄⁄⁄ (0.0001)
Time since Mkt launch 0.0044⁄⁄⁄ (0.0009) 0.0045⁄⁄⁄ (0.0009) 0.0045⁄⁄⁄ (0.0009)
High app rating 0.0041 (0.0093) 0.0030 (0.0094) 0.0033 (0.0094)
Store 0.0944⁄⁄⁄ (0.0267) 0.1264⁄⁄⁄ (0.0332) 0.1090⁄⁄⁄ (0.0289)
Social network 0.0614⁄ (0.0254) 0.0619⁄ (0.0259) 0.0785⁄⁄ (0.0251)
Money & finance 0.0489⁄ (0.0245) 0.0326 (0.0243) 0.0859⁄⁄⁄ (0.0260)
Photo & video 0.0715+ (0.0383) 0.0626⁄ (0.0311) 0.2046⁄⁄⁄ (0.0579)
Entertainment 0.1314⁄⁄⁄ (0.0323) 0.1404⁄⁄⁄ (0.0339) 0.1504⁄⁄⁄ (0.0337)
Education 0.0203 (0.0264) 0.0041 (0.0265) 0.0621⁄ (0.0318)
Healthcare & fitness 0.0310 (0.0255) 0.0474+ (0.0250) 0.0057 (0.0265)
Music 0.0775 (0.0564) 0.0039 (0.0538) 0.0588 (0.0571)
News & magazines 0.0189 (0.0487) 0.0121 (0.0432) 0.0027 (0.0525)
Utility 0.0337 (0.0406) 0.0115 (0.0330) 0.1267⁄ (0.0526)
Customizations 0.0050 (0.0539) 0.0285 (0.0465) 0.1073⁄⁄⁄ (0.0306)
Travel & navigations 0.0388 (0.0284) 0.0132 (0.0444) 0.0210 (0.0516)
H1a/b Freemium 0.0839⁄⁄ (0.0319) 0.0652⁄ (0.0297) 0.0547 (0.0352)
Paid 0.0709⁄⁄⁄ (0.0155) 0.0086 (0.0245) 0.0192 (0.0370)
H2a/b Freemium X store 0.1291⁄⁄ (0.0448)
Paid X store 0.0857⁄⁄⁄ (0.0262)
H3 Freemium X social 0.1601⁄⁄⁄ (0.0414)
Freemium X education 0.0924⁄ (0.0392)
Freemium X utility 0.1828⁄⁄⁄ (0.0558)
Freemium X customizations 0.0578 (0.0464)
Freemium X travel & navigations 0.0653 (0.0570)
Paid X photo & video 0.1068⁄⁄ (0.0372)
Paid X news & magazines 0.1399⁄ (0.0658)
Paid X travel & navigations 0.0183 (0.0358)
H4 In-app 0.0898⁄⁄ (0.0314) 0.0786⁄⁄ (0.0281) 0.0079 (0.0358)
H5 In-app X store 0.2326⁄⁄⁄ (0.0350)
H6 In-app X photo & video 0.1142+ (0.0601)
In-app X customizations 0.1605⁄⁄⁄ (0.0501)
In-app X travel & navigations 0.0173 (0.0518)
Constant 0.1342⁄⁄⁄ (0.0421) 0.2746⁄⁄⁄ (0.0444) 0.2558⁄⁄⁄ (0.0535)
Note: + p < 0.10, ⁄ p < 0.05, ⁄⁄ p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001. Number of obs.: 2177. Number of apps: 110. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Note
that all the interactions not reported in the table were deleted either because of perfect multicollinearity or because of the absence of the given revenue model and/or in-app
purchase in the selected category.
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4–6, the negative and significant coefficient of the Freemium
dummy, which indeed represents the effect of the freemiummodel
as compared with free model in Google Play, implies that the free-
mium model has actually a negative effect in Google Play. That is,
this revenue model is actually less effective in terms of revenue
performance than the free revenue model (and thus also in com-
parison with the paid revenuemodel). This result is fully confirmed
for observations also by performing the Mann–Whitney test, which
supports rejection of revenue performance equivalence and shows
that the probability of observing better revenue ranks for free apps
is approximately 0.9. The test also rejects the revenue equivalence
between freemium and paid models in Google Play, showing that
the probability of observing higher ranks for paid apps is quite high
(0.775). We explain these results as the consequence of high pro-
duct cannibalization in Google Play. Indeed, the presence of a free
version can cannibalize the paid version in this platform given that
Android users on average tend to limit their spending on apps
(Halaburda et al. 2011; Ghose and Han 2014; Edwards 2014;
Nerney 2014) and thus they are more likely to decide to utilize
the free version without upgrading to the full paid version. There-
fore, since the freemium revenue model relies on a considerable
portion of users that will self-select to pay for the app perhaps afterhaving experimented with the free version, its effectiveness will be
greatly lower in a platform accessed by consumers with relatively
low willingness to pay. In fact, in this case, the freemium revenue
model will suffer from low app sales as the portion of paying users
is not sufficiently developed, and from insufficient advertising rev-
enues as the model is not fully centered on this revenue stream.
Thus, the revenue performance of this model turns out to be infe-
rior even to both paid and free models.
Overall, this first set of evidences suggests that H1a and H1b are
not fully confirmed because the paid and freemium revenue mod-
els do not always lead to better revenue performance than free
apps. Rather the preference for these models depends on the store
where apps are marketed. Also, no clear dominance of freemium
vs. paid revenue models is confirmed. On the other hand, the find-
ings suggest that H2a and H2b are confirmed, as the superior rev-
enue performance of paid and freemium revenue models is more
likely to occur in the Apple’s App Store as compared with the free
revenue model. Indeed, in Google Play, freemium revenue model is
shown to be even inferior to the free model, while not univocal
indications can be drawn with regard to the comparison of paid
and free models. In contrast, both freemium and paid revenue
models are shown to be associated with better revenue ranks than
free apps in the Apple’s App Store.
Table 6
Results under Random Effects regression models (a = 0.8).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coefficient Std. errors Coefficient Std. errors Coefficient Std. errors
Controls Developer type 0.0057 (0.0147) 0.0042 (0.0098) 0.0162 (0.0142)
Number developer apps 0.0010⁄⁄⁄ (0.0003) 0.0010⁄⁄⁄ (0.0003) 0.0010⁄⁄⁄ (0.0003)
Company fame 0.0107⁄ (0.0047) 0.0128⁄⁄ (0.0049) 0.0139⁄⁄ (0.0052)
Size 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000) 0.0000 (0.0000)
New entries 0.0001⁄⁄ (0.0000) 0.0001⁄⁄ (0.0000) 0.0001⁄⁄ (0.0000)
Time since Mkt launch 0.0020⁄⁄ (0.0007) 0.0020⁄⁄ (0.0007) 0.0020⁄⁄ (0.0007)
High app rating 0.0019 (0.0037) 0.0016 (0.0037) 0.0018 (0.0037)
Store 0.0563⁄ (0.0223) 0.0318⁄ (0.0155) 0.0641⁄⁄ (0.0244)
Social network 0.0420⁄ (0.0192) 0.0415⁄ (0.0192) 0.0473⁄ (0.0197)
Money & finance 0.0137 (0.0101) 0.0056 (0.0098) 0.0273⁄⁄ (0.0099)
Photo & video 0.0377⁄ (0.0189) 0.0356⁄ (0.0156) 0.0886⁄⁄ (0.0336)
Entertainment 0.0826⁄⁄ (0.0292) 0.0877⁄⁄ (0.0309) 0.0911⁄⁄ (0.0310)
Education 0.0113 (0.0103) 0.0047 (0.0110) 0.0296+ (0.0157)
Healthcare & fitness 0.0151 (0.0110) 0.0233⁄ (0.0111) 0.0018 (0.0102)
Music 0.0478+ (0.0254) 0.0039 (0.0538) 0.0435+ (0.0252)
News & magazines 0.0258 (0.0207) 0.0121 (0.0432) 0.0195 (0.0206)
Utility 0.0212 (0.0178) 0.0115 (0.0330) 0.0659⁄ (0.0262)
Customizations 0.0014 (0.0238) 0.0285 (0.0465) 0.0477⁄⁄ (0.0165)
Travel & navigations 0.0193 (0.0222) 0.0132 (0.0444) 0.0186 (0.0279)
H1a/b Freemium 0.0244+ (0.0138) 0.0652⁄ (0.0297) 0.0272 (0.0181)
Paid 0.0115+ (0.0063) 0.0086 (0.0245) 0.0208 (0.0215)
H2a/b Freemium X store 0.1291⁄⁄ (0.0448)
Paid X store 0.0857⁄⁄⁄ (0.0262)
H3 Freemium X social 0.0524⁄ (0.0206)
Freemium X education 0.0362+ (0.0185)
Freemium X utility 0.0830⁄⁄ (0.0276)
Freemium X customizations 0.0348+ (0.0201)
Freemium X travel & navigations 0.0124 (0.0277)
Paid X photo & video 0.0382+ (0.0209)
Paid X news & magazines 0.0584⁄ (0.0286)
Paid X travel & navigations 0.0233 (0.0227)
H4 In-app 0.0359⁄ (0.0154) 0.0786⁄⁄ (0.0281) 0.0018 (0.0177)
H5 In-app X store 0.2326⁄⁄⁄ (0.0350)
H6 In-app X photo & video 0.0404 (0.0301)
In-app X customizations 0.0815⁄⁄ (0.0278)
In-app X travel & navigations 0.0028 (0.0273)
Constant 0.0366+ (0.0222) 0.2746⁄⁄⁄ (0.0444) 0.0859⁄⁄ (0.0301)
Note: + p < 0.10, ⁄ p < 0.05, ⁄⁄ p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001. Number of obs.: 2177. Number of apps: 110. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Note
that all the interactions not reported in the table were deleted either because of perfect multicollinearity or because of the absence of the given revenue model and/or in-app
purchase in the selected category.
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accessed by consumers characterized by relatively low willingness
to spend money to download apps (Halaburda et al. 2011; Ghose
and Han 2014; Edwards 2014; Nerney 2014). Hence, in this
platform, the hypothesized preference of payments-based models
over the free revenue model turns out to be mitigated and even
reversed (in certain cases) because a large number of users would
only consider downloading free apps. In contrast, Apple’s App Store
is on average accessed by more valuable consumers, who are not
much worried about spending their money to download the apps
they need. Thus, the paid and freemium revenue models are more
effective in generating revenue to developers in Apple’s App Store
than in Google Play.
Before discussing our findings on how the effect of revenue
models varies across app categories (H3), it is important to point
out that not all the interactions between the revenue models and
the app category (and similarly those between the in-app purchase
and the app category) appear in Model 3 of Tables 4–6 and not all
the categories are reported in Table 7 where present the
Mann–Whitney tests. This is because in many cases not all the rev-
enue models are utilized for all categories, at least in our randomly
collected sample. In addition, some interactions are omitted due to
perfect multicollinearity when only one revenue model is utilizedin a given category. For instance, from Table 3 the freemiummodel
is the only revenue model utilized for apps falling into Music,
Healthcare & Fitness and Money & Finance categories, whereas this
revenue model is never utilized Photo & Video, Entertainment, and
News and Magazines categories. Also, in certain categories only
two revenue models are utilized. Finally, note that the free revenue
model is considered as a baseline in our regression analysis, thus
all relative interactions are obviously not included in Tables 4–6.
Table 7 provides the only categories for which a comparison of rev-
enue models is possible in our sample. Thus, we refer to this
Table to present this particular result, also in light of the fact that
the results from Model 3 (reported in Tables 4–6) are mostly iden-
tical (unless explicitly pointed out). Indeed, both empirical
approaches we utilize show that the effect of the revenue model
can vary across app categories, thus providing support to our
hypothesis H3 overall. Specifically, we find that News & Magazines
is a category where the paid revenue model does not perform as
well as the free model because the hypothesis of equal revenue
performance is strongly rejected and the probability of observing
better revenue ranks for free apps is quite high (0.925). As we have
explained when introducing H3, the rationale behind this finding is
that these types of apps work well as two-sided markets and thus
rely on other revenue streams, mostly advertising. Users have been
Table 7
Mann–Whitney tests for matched subsamples.
Tested hypotheses Ho: rank(X) = rank (Y) X Y z p-value Prob (rank (Y) is better than rank (X))
Apple App Store
Paid vs. free Paid Free 2.955 0.003⁄⁄ 0.379⁄⁄
Freemium vs. free Freemium Free 4.085 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.235⁄⁄⁄
Freemium vs. paid Freemium Paid 0.863 0.3882 0.562
In-app In-app = 1 In-app = 0 3.630 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.349⁄⁄⁄
Google Play
Paid vs. free Paid Free 2.294 0.0218⁄ 0.405⁄
Freemium vs. free Freemium Free 8.669 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.905⁄⁄⁄
Freemium vs. paid Freemium Paid 6.541 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.775⁄⁄⁄
In-app In-app = 1 In-app = 0 2.328 0.020⁄ 0.607⁄
Freemium vs. free
Social Freemium Free 5.411 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Travel & Navigations Freemium Free 5.411 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 1.000⁄⁄⁄
Games Freemium Free 4.469 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.743⁄⁄⁄
Paid vs. free
News & Magazines Paid Free 4.601 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.925⁄⁄⁄
Travel & Navigations Paid Free 4.194 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.887⁄⁄⁄
Photo & Video Paid Free 4.231 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.000⁄⁄⁄
Games Paid Free 0.498 0.618 0.485
Freemium vs. paid
Education Paid Freemium 3.360 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.810⁄⁄⁄
Utility Paid Freemium 2.059 0.040⁄ 0.634⁄
Customizations Paid Freemium 0.077 0.939 0.505
Travel & Navigations Paid Freemium 4.263 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.223⁄⁄⁄
Games Paid Freemium 1.761 0.078+ 0.402+
In-app
Photo & Video In-app = 1 In-app = 0 4.222 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.890⁄⁄⁄
News & Magazines In-app = 1 In-app = 0 3.679 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.840⁄⁄⁄
Customizations In-app = 1 In-app = 0 5.411 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 1.000⁄⁄⁄
Games In-app = 1 In-app = 0 3.873 0.000⁄⁄⁄ 0.312⁄⁄⁄
The size of matched subsamples utilized for the Mann–Whitney test varies from a few hundreds observations to almost one thousand observations.
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and thus are likely to expect to still have access for free (Wagner
et al. 2014). Therefore, in spite of the general tendency of tilting
away from the free revenue model for online content (Pauwels
and Weiss 2008), our result suggests that for news and magazine
applications, relying on advertising is still the most suitable
strategy. By looking at Table 7, a similar result is observed for
the category Travel & Navigations. However, in this case, the result
is not consistent with that derived from the regression analysis,
thus no univocal indication can be provided. In contrast, for the
category Photo & Video both empirical approaches show that the
paid model leads to superior revenue performance than the free
model. The rationale is that customers are usually willing to pay
for photo and video applications due to the considerable added
value of these types of apps (Deloitte 2016).7
The freemium model is shown to be particularly effective as
compared with the free model in case of Social Networks applica-
tions. The freemium model is utilized for Social Network apps only
Apple’s App Store. Therefore, the positive effect of the freemium
model in Apple’s App Store as compared with the free revenue
model is particularly amplified in this category. No univocal
indication can be obtained for the category Travel & Navigations
as the free model is shown to be preferable from Table 7, but the
corresponding interaction in Tables 4–6 is never significant. With
regard to the comparison of paid and freemium revenue models,
the freemium model should be preferred to the paid model in case
of Education and Utility applications. Indeed, both regression anal-
ysis and Mann–Whitney tests provide this indication. As discussed
when introducing H3, all these product categories are particularly7 Note that the freemium revenue model is never utilized for News & Magazines and
Photo & Video categories, as it can be seen from Table 3.complex and satisfy more sophisticated needs (e.g., education)
than others, thus usually providing considerable value to cus-
tomers. However, the complex nature of the needs these apps
should satisfy often creates relevant uncertainty about the real
quality delivered to users. In this case, consistently with our find-
ing, the freemium revenue model is preferable as users are more
likely to prefer first to experiment with the basic features of the
product before purchasing the full paid version (Cheng et al.
2015). No univocal indication can be instead obtained for the cat-
egory Travel & Navigations as the freemium model is shown to be
more preferable than the paid model in Table 7, but the corre-
sponding interactions in Tables 4–6 are never significant. The com-
parison between freemium and paid models is also shown to be
not significant for the category Customizations under both types
of analysis. Finally, the Mann–Whitney tests performed in Table 7
allow us to compare the performance of revenue models in the cat-
egory Games. This comparison was not possible in the regression
analysis, as we have chosen the category Games as a baseline. From
Table 7, we note that for apps falling into this category paid and
free models are equivalent and both should be preferred to the
freemium model. The explanation could be due to cannibalization
reasons as games are by far the most popular category of apps and
thus they are more likely to attract a large mass of consumers who
are not willing to upgrade to the paid version if they have the free
version at disposal. Taken together, all these results confirm that
certain revenue models are more suitable for certain types of apps,
while being less appropriate for others.
Moving to the effect of the presence of in-app purchase, the
positive and significant coefficient of this variable in Model 1 of
Tables 4–6 would seem to suggest that the effect of enabling in-
app purchase on revenue ranks is positive. However, to understand
whether this effect holds irrespective of the distribution platform,
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regression model or perform the Mann–Whitney test in each speci-
fic distribution platform. In this respect, Model 2 shows that this
interaction term, which captures the effect of in-app purchase in
Apple’s App Store, is positive and significant. On the other hand,
the dummy In-app, which, in this case, captures the effect of in-
app purchase in Google Play, is negative and significant. The same
result is observed by performing theMann–Whitney test in Table 7.
In this table, it is indeed shown that for both Apple’s App Store and
Google Play we can strongly reject the hypothesis that apps with
in-app purchase display similar revenue performance to apps that
do not offer this opportunity. However, the effect of in-app pur-
chase is opposite in the two stores. In the Apple’s App Store the
probability to observe better revenue ranks for apps without in-
app purchase is quite low (0.349), whereas it is quite higher than
½ (the exact value being 0.607) in Google Play. The fact that the
effect of in-app purchase is opposite across the two stores and it
is positive only in Apple’s App Store implies that our hypothesis
H4 is not supported while hypothesis H5 is confirmed. The ratio-
nale of this result should lie again on the relatively low willingness
to pay of consumers accessing Google Play. In fact, theory (e.g.,
Bhargava and Choudhary 2008) suggests that the existence of
two segments with distinct valuations for the high-end and low-
end versions is necessary to achieve higher profitability under a
versioning strategy, as compared with selling only one version.
The highly valuable segment is on average not adequately devel-
oped in Google Play, while being relevant in the Apple’s App Store
(Ghose and Han 2014; Nerney 2014). Therefore, we observe that
offering in-app purchase is an inferior strategy in the former store,
while it is preferable in the latter store.
Regarding the role of in-app purchase among categories (H6),
the results in Models 3 of Tables 4–6 and those in Table 7 show
that the effect of such practice on app revenue performance
changes across categories, although to a lesser extent as compared
to the case of revenue models. This supports our hypothesis H6. In
particular, the two types of analysis are consistent, especially with
regard to the negative effect of in-app purchase for the category
Customizations. This negative effect of in-app purchase might be
explained by the fact that consumers usually perceive this type
of apps, which are essentially wallpapers for smartphones, as lowly
valuable so they are unlikely to spend money to upgrade to nicer
features. In contrast, the Mann–Whitney test performed for the
category Games shows that in-app purchase is beneficial in terms
of revenue. As a matter of fact, the probability of observing high
revenue ranks for apps with no in-app purchase is only 0.312
and the hypothesis of equivalence is strongly rejected. The ratio-
nale is possibly that game users perceive in-app purchase as a
way to personalize the games by buying within the app new game
characters, new credits and new challenges. Therefore, a consider-
able portion of them is willing to purchase additional features
inside the app.
To facilitate the understanding of our findings, Table 8 summa-
rizes our major results and the relative explanations we have pro-
vided in this section.5. Implications and conclusions
This paper provides unique empirical evidence of the roles of
the revenue models and in-app purchase in driving app revenue
performance, as measured by app daily revenue rank. More impor-
tantly, it offers unique evidence of how the effects of these factors
hinge upon the distribution platform where the app itself is mar-
keted as well as the category to which the given app belongs.
Therefore, our analysis has relevant implications for both existing
literature and practitioners, which we discuss below.5.1. Implications for the existing literature
Our findings add to the existing knowledge of the app market
by revealing how the revenue performance is influenced by the
choice of revenue models (and in-app purchase) and how this
influence is strongly contingent on the distribution platform as
well as the nature of the app. Previous studies on the app market
have indeed mostly disregarded these aspects, which instead are
perceived as pivotal by developers (Sourcebits 2014; Pappas
2013; Wilcox 2013; Munir 2014). Moreover, our study adds to
the existing literature on the choice of revenue models in online
markets (e.g., Pauwels and Weiss 2008), by shedding light on the
revenue performance implications of revenue models in the speci-
fic context of the app market. In this environment several revenue
models are commonly utilized, but performance implications have
never been examined before. In this regard, our study offers novel
‘‘food for thought” to researchers in the field of e-commerce by
documenting that the suitability of a revenue model depends on
the distribution platform where the app is marketed as well as
the nature of the app itself. As a matter of fact, our analysis reveals
that both paid and freemium revenue models guarantee higher
revenue performance than the free revenue model in the Apple’s
App Store. No significant differences in terms of revenue perfor-
mance emerge between paid and freemium models in this store.
The results for the Apple’s App Store can be explained by the rela-
tively high average willingness to pay of consumers accessing this
store. Indeed, Apple consumers are on average not worried about
spending money to buy apps or (in case of the freemium model)
upgrade the full paid version after having tried the free version,
if quality is delivered to them. The results for the Apple’s App Store
are consistent with the basic figures provided by industry (Lunden
2013) as well as with the observation that many online content
providers have started tilting away from the free revenue model,
which mainly relies on advertising, to favor more payment-based
models (Pauwels and Weiss 2008; Clemons 2009; Zott et al. 2011).
Interestingly, the same results do not occur in Google Play.
Rather, in this store, we find that the adoption of a freemium rev-
enue model has a negative impact on app revenue performance as
compared with the free revenue model. We have explained that
this interesting result is caused by the large product cannibaliza-
tion to which paid versions are exposed in presence of a free ver-
sion, as a consequence of the relatively low willingness to pay of
Google users on average. The cannibalization phenomenon is lar-
gely detrimental for the freemium model. Indeed, on the one hand,
a few consumers will upgrade to full paid version so low revenue
will be generated from it. On the other hand, not sufficient ads rev-
enue will be generated from the free version because, differently
from a pure free revenue model, the freemium revenue model is
not fully centered on ads. As a result, in Google Play, the revenue
performance of the freemium model will be inferior to those of
paid and free models. No univocal indications from the two types
of analysis emerge with regard to the comparison between paid
and free models in Google Play. Perhaps, this is due to the fact that
the absence of free version eliminates the risk of product cannibal-
ization for the paid version and makes the paid model a reasonable
alternative to the free model as developers of paid apps can still
benefit from a small segment of highly valuable users that can
afford buying a paid app. Our study also provides novel evidence
on how the effects of revenue models can vary across app cate-
gories. That is, our findings show that these effects can be rein-
forced or weakened (or even reversed), depending on the specific
category to which the given app belongs.
Finally, our findings on the role of in-app purchase add to the
versioning literature (e.g., Bhargava and Choudhary, 2008) by pro-
viding unique empirical evidence on how a peculiar type of ver-
sioning strategy, which is indeed known as in-app purchase in
Table 8
Summary of the results and explanations.
Hypotheses Status Explanation
H1a Not
confirmed
Hypothesis H1a is not confirmed as paid apps are not always associated with better daily revenue ranks than free apps. Indeed, in Google
Play, no significant differences in revenue performance arise. The reason is due to the fact that users have relatively low willingness to pay.
Hence, in spite of the general tendency of tilting away from the free revenue model in online markets, this model can still be as effective as
the paid model in environments characterized by relatively low willingness to pay.
H1b Not
confirmed
Hypothesis H1b is not confirmed, as freemium apps are not always associated with better daily revenue ranks than free apps. Indeed, in
Google Play, the opposite occurs, which makes the freemium revenue model inferior to both free and paid models. The rationale is that the
presence of a free version in the freemium model can cannibalize the paid version in this platform given that Android users have on
average limited willingness to pay and thus may decide to utilize the free version without upgrading to the full paid version. Also the free
version will not be able to generate enough advertising revenue because, differently from the free model, the freemium model is not fully
centered on generating revenue from ads.
H2a Confirmed Hypothesis H2a is confirmed because results show that it is more likely that paid apps are associated with better daily revenue ranks than
free apps in the Apple’s App Store. Indeed, paid apps are associated with better revenue rank than free apps in this store, whereas no
significant difference emerges in Google Play. The reason is that Apple’s App Store players are more willing to pay that Android users, thus
they are less worried about spending their money if quality is delivered to them.
H2b Confirmed Hypothesis H2b is confirmed because results show that it is more likely that freemium apps are associated with better daily revenue ranks
than free apps in the Apple’s App Store. The rationale is the same as that provided for H2a. Moreover, no significant differences in terms of
revenue performance between paid and freemium apps emerge in Apple’s App Store.
H3 Confirmed H3 is confirmed as our results show that certain revenue models are more (or less) preferable in certain categories. This is because
different categories satisfies different needs, attract different consumer segments, and are associated with different levels of uncertainty
with regard to product value.
H4 Not
Confirmed
H4 is not confirmed as apps enabling in-app purchase are not always associated with better daily revenue ranks. Indeed, in Google Play the
opposite occurs. That is, ceteris paribus, apps without in-app purchase leads to higher revenue performance. The rationale is that, according
to theory, in-app purchase can be optimal in presence of two segments with distinct valuations for high-end version and low-end version.
As the highly valuable segment is on average not adequately developed in Google Play, the in-app purchase strategy turns out to be inferior
in this store.
H5 Confirmed H5 is confirmed because the option of in-app purchase is more likely to be effective in terms of daily revenue rank in the Apple’s App Store
than in Google Play. The rationale follows from above. Indeed, differently from Google Play, the highly valuable segment is largely
developed in Apple’s App Store due to the higher average consumers’ willingness to pay in this store.
H6 Confirmed H3 is confirmed (although to a less extent as compared with H3) as our results show that in-app purchase can be more (or less) preferable
in certain categories. The explanation follows that provided for H3.
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suggest that in-app purchase is also a positive determinant of app
revenue performance only in the Apple’s App Store. As we have
explained, this is because a segment with high willingness to pay
is required to effectively practice price discrimination (Chen
et al., 2014; Roma et al., 2014; Roma et al., 2015). While this seg-
ment is certainly present in Apple’s App Store, it might not be well
developed in Google Play, thus leading to a negative impact in
terms of revenue performance in the latter store. Similarly to the
revenue models above, the category is likely to influence the rela-
tionship between in-app purchase and app revenue performance,
although to a lesser extent.
5.2. Managerial implications
Our findings have also a number of remarkable implications and
guidelines for developers involved in revenue model and in-app
purchase decisions. First, we inform developers that the preference
for a revenue model strongly depends on the platform where the
given app is marketed as well as on the category of the app itself.
Therefore, developers should take into account these two factors
when making a crucial decision for their business development
such as the choice of the revenue model for their apps. According
to our findings, developers in the Apple’s App Store should con-
sider following the general tendency illustrated by numerous
recent studies on online content provision and take advantage of
the demonstrated Apple users’ high willingness to pay by adopting
payment-based revenue models, rather than relying on advertising
streams of revenue. In particular, developers of Social Network apps
in Apple’s App Store should be interested in the freemium revenue
model as its impact is shown to be very strong for such category.
On the other hand, our study warn developers from using the free-
miummodel in Google Play because consumers in this store are on
average less prone to spend money on apps. Therefore, the portion
of them that will self-select to switch from the free version to the
paid version is limited in this store. In addition, the revenues fromadvertising are insufficient to compensate the loss from sales given
that the revenue model is not fully centered on this alternative
stream. As a result, differently, from the Apple’s App Store, devel-
opers in Google Play should avoid adopting this hybrid model
and rather opt for either free or paid ones as they are shown to
be equivalent in terms of app revenue performance. By using a paid
model developers eliminate the risk of product cannibalization, as
the free version is not released. Hence they can benefit from selling
to a relatively small segment of users that are more willing to pay
than others and do not have a free version alternative at disposal
for download. Those commercializing free apps will instead benefit
from the large number of users not willing to pay for apps but still
able to bear the disadvantage of being subject to nagging advertis-
ing. The interesting result on the negative effect of freemium
model in Google Play has another important implication for devel-
opers. Indeed, the extent of product cannibalization between free
and paid versions arguably depends on the characteristics of the
free version as compared with those of the full paid version. If
the free version does not differ much from the paid version in
terms of number of features and overall quality, the risk of canni-
balization clearly increases. For numerous apps, it can be observed
that, except for the presence of (more) advertising in the free ver-
sion, the differences between the two versions are not as neat as
they should be to avoid the detrimental effects of product canni-
balization. Therefore, to render the freemium revenue model viable
in an environment where the average consumer willingness to pay
is relatively low, developers may rethink about their version design
strategies and differentiate the two versions significantly.
With regard to the suitability of revenue models in specific cat-
egories, developers should take into consideration the freemium
model for apps, such as those falling into Education or Utility cate-
gories, which are more complex or satisfy more sophisticated and
valuable needs. For these types of value-added apps even Google
users are more likely to commit to purchase the paid version after
experimenting with the free one. Similarly, Photo & Video apps in
both Google and Apple stores should be commercialized using
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activities such as photo uploading and sharing (Deloitte 2016).
For Games apps the freemium model may not be as effective as
paid or free revenue models due to the fact game apps usually tar-
get mass app market and thus the majority of users are unwilling
to upgrade to the paid version if they have a free version available.
Finally, while in general payment-based revenue models should be
preferred in Apple’s App Store, developers of News & Magazine
apps in both Apple and Google stores should not forgo the free rev-
enue model as it may yield superior revenue performance than the
paid revenue model (the freemiummodel is not utilized in this cat-
egory, at least in our sample). In fact, these types of apps operate as
two-sided markets, usually attracting large number of users and
thus allowing developers to monetize from third parties such as
advertisers.
Our findings also inform developers that the cross-store differ-
ences in terms of consumer willingness to pay also determine a dif-
ferent impact of the in-app purchase strategy on app revenue
performance in the two stores. Similarly to the case of revenue
models, given that the willingness to pay of consumers is relatively
large in Apple’s App Store, developers in this store should consider
the opportunity to segment users by charging them different prices
based on the number and quality of features they choose for their
apps via in-app purchase. A notable exception in the effect of in-
app purchase in App Store is related to Customizations apps, for
which users are reluctant to upgrade to enhanced features, given
the low added value of this kind of applications. On the other hand,
the in-app purchase strategy is shown to be always detrimental to
developers in Google Play. Because of their lower willingness to
pay on average, most of Google Play users will enjoy the lower
price charged for the base version without upgrading to better fea-
tures via in-app purchase, thus hurting developers’ profitability.
For such reason, developers may consider forgoing the adoption
of the in-app purchase option in Google Play.
5.3. Limitations and future research directions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study examining
the effect of revenue models and in-app purchase on the app rev-
enue performance and how such relationships are influenced by
the distribution platform and the app category. Therefore, there
are some limitations, which open the room for future research
directions.
First, our choice of considering daily revenue ranks as our mea-
sure of app revenue performance is due to the fact that revenue of
apps are not publicly available and, to the best of our knowledge,
no commercial database provides actual data. Hence, it appears
reasonable to utilize revenue ranks, also by virtue of the relation-
ship between sales and ranks, which has been largely demon-
strated in online markets (Brynjolfsson et al. 2003; Chevalier and
Goolsbee 2003) and specifically in the app market (Garg and
Telang 2013). Nevertheless, future studies may consider actual rev-
enue or profits as measures of performance when these data
become available for the app market.
Second, our random selection has resulted in similar app cate-
gory distribution across the two stores, which has increased our
confidence that potential selection bias concerns due to market
heterogeneity are unlikely to arise. However, future studies could
consider applying other selection bias reducing techniques to fur-
ther address this issue. Also future studies could focus on specific
categories in order to gather more observations related to one
specific category and thus further validate our findings, especially
with regard to the impact of categories for which the two statistical
approaches we utilized in the paper provide contrasting results.
Third, our study focuses on the Italian version of Apple Store
and Google Play in a time span of twenty weeks. In order toincrease the generality of our findings, future research could study
the determinants of app revenue performance in other markets
such as US, UK, etc. or look at a broader time span of observation.
For instance, employing different samples collected in different
years could allow further validation of our results.
Fourth, to reduce the data collection effort we have decided to
consider one specific day of the week, i.e., Friday, instead of varying
the day of observation every week. Future studies could validate
our findings, for instance by observing apps more days in a week
in a shorter time span of observation.
Finally, in addition to these avenues for improvement, there are
a plethora of potential directions for future research on the app
market as research in this field has just started. Particularly, the
study of developers’ entry strategies and the analysis of the plat-
form choice for new app launch seem to be very promising direc-
tions for future research.
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